# Telegram Task Earning

## Phase 06 — Security Middleware Report

| Field                   | Result                            |
| ----------------------- | --------------------------------- |
| Status                  | **Complete**                      |
| Completed               | 2026-09-03                        |
| Project version         | `0.6.0`                           |
| HTTP security           | Helmet 8 + explicit CSP           |
| Browser trust boundary  | Exact-origin credentialed CORS    |
| Request integrity       | HMAC signed double-submit CSRF    |
| Distributed rate limit  | Atomic Redis fixed-window counter |
| Environment contract    | 82 validated keys                 |
| Automated tests         | 84 passed                         |
| Required project layout | 77 directories / 137 files        |
| npm scripts             | 34                                |
| Runtime dependencies    | 6 exact-pinned packages           |
| Full dependency audit   | 0 known vulnerabilities           |
| Production-only audit   | 0 known vulnerabilities           |

## Outcome

Phase 6 wraps the Phase 5 Express core in an ordered HTTP security boundary. Current routes now receive secure browser headers, exact-origin CORS decisions, global request throttling, content-type checks, CSRF enforcement for unsafe methods, bounded parsers, maintenance and ban providers, audit hooks, and central safe error handling.

The project remains honest about identity: Telegram authentication is Phase 7 and Admin sessions/RBAC are Phase 8. Phase 6 exports identity-dependent gates but does not trust a client-supplied user, ban, permission, reward, balance, or bypass value.

## Implemented controls

### Browser and transport policy

- Helmet provides CSP, MIME sniffing protection, referrer policy, cross-origin policies, and other secure defaults.
- CSP allows local scripts/styles, disables objects and inline script attributes, and restricts framing to the deployment allowlist.
- `X-Frame-Options` is deliberately disabled so it cannot conflict with Telegram embedding; CSP `frame-ancestors` is authoritative.
- Production responses include one-year HSTS and `upgrade-insecure-requests`.
- Permissions Policy disables unused camera, microphone, location, payment, USB, and motion-sensor features.

### Request-origin and state integrity

- CORS performs exact origin matching and supports credentials without wildcard origins.
- API, health, and metadata responses use `Cache-Control: no-store`.
- Approved preflights advertise only the fixed method/header contract.
- CSRF tokens contain a timestamp, cryptographic nonce, and HMAC-SHA-256 signature.
- Unsafe methods require a matching cookie/header pair and a valid non-expired signature.
- Secure deployments use a host-only `__Host-` CSRF cookie prefix.
- Token comparison uses timing-safe signature verification.
- The token binding resolver automatically uses a verified session ID when a later authentication layer supplies one.

### Resource control

- JSON and URL-encoded requests have an environment-controlled byte limit.
- URL-encoded forms are capped at 100 parameters.
- Unsupported body media types fail before parser work.
- Global throttling uses a SHA-256-derived client key rather than storing a plaintext IP in the counter key.
- Production uses Redis; one Lua script atomically increments the counter and applies its TTL.
- Redis connection attempts are bounded, TLS certificate verification is preserved, and readiness fails closed on dependency loss.

### Application foundations

- Zod route validation stores only schema-approved values and returns input-free issue metadata.
- Maintenance and ban decisions are dependency-injected from trusted server providers.
- Controller-selected audit context is recorded after response completion without blocking the response.
- Idempotency keys are syntax-checked and HMAC-digested before repository reservation.
- Managed URLs use explicit scheme/domain rules and reject embedded credentials.
- Output helpers provide HTML escaping and control-character-safe plain text.
- New stable error codes cover CORS, CSRF, body limits, media type, throttling, Redis, maintenance, bans, and idempotency.

## Startup, readiness, and shutdown

When production selects Redis rate limiting, web startup connects and pings Redis before MySQL capability verification and HTTP readiness. A partial startup closes every created resource. Readiness checks lifecycle, MySQL, and required Redis without exposing connection details.

Graceful shutdown removes readiness, drains HTTP, closes Redis, and closes MySQL last. Shutdown remains idempotent and bounded by `SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT_MS`.

## Verification scope

The automated suite covers CSP/header behavior, Telegram framing policy, production HSTS, exact-origin CORS, preflight behavior, CSRF token issue/accept/reject paths, invalid JSON, unsupported media types, oversized bodies, rate-limit thresholds and headers, fail-closed rate-store errors, maintenance liveness, Redis readiness failures, Redis Lua namespacing, TLS/reconnect configuration, Redis lifecycle, HMAC tampering, token expiry/binding, URL allowlists, output escaping, validation, bans, audit hooks, and idempotency reservations.

The complete Phase 1–6 suite passes 84 tests. Linting, formatting, the 82-key example environment, all database schema checks, production CSS builds, and the 77-directory/137-file project contract pass. Full and production-only dependency audits both report zero known vulnerabilities.

No live database, Redis service, Telegram bot, or external deployment was accessed. All integration behavior was tested with deterministic local servers and dependency doubles.

## Security boundaries still deferred

- Phase 7: Telegram raw `initData` HMAC verification, freshness, user identity, bot webhook secret, and update deduplication.
- Phase 8: Admin Argon2id password verification, TOTP, sessions, RBAC, and permission middleware.
- Phase 10: Ledger repository-backed idempotency, locking, and double-entry posting.
- Phase 15: Streaming upload validation, file signatures, image limits, quarantine, and media authorization.
- Phase 20: Edge WAF/rate limits, Nginx limits, deployment TLS, monitoring, backup drills, and penetration testing.

Application middleware alone cannot stop a volumetric DDoS attack. Production still requires the infrastructure controls documented in the architecture plan.

## Phase 7 handoff

Phase 7 can insert Telegram identity/session verification ahead of the identity-dependent gates, rotate the CSRF token after authentication, apply the stricter authentication route budget, and keep the current error, logging, readiness, and shutdown contracts unchanged.

## Primary references

- [Express production security](https://expressjs.com/en/advanced/best-practice-security/)
- [OWASP CSRF Prevention Cheat Sheet](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Cross-Site_Request_Forgery_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html)
- [OWASP HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)
- [OWASP Denial of Service Cheat Sheet](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Denial_of_Service_Cheat_Sheet.html)

**Phase 6 status: COMPLETE AND VERIFIED.**