npm warn Unknown env config "http-proxy". This will stop working in the next major version of npm.

> telegram-task-earning@0.19.1 check
> node scripts/run-quality-checks.js


[phase-19-check] Running lint
npm warn Unknown env config "http-proxy". This will stop working in the next major version of npm.

> telegram-task-earning@0.19.1 lint
> eslint . --max-warnings=0


[phase-19-check] Running format:check
npm warn Unknown env config "http-proxy". This will stop working in the next major version of npm.

> telegram-task-earning@0.19.1 format:check
> prettier . --check

Checking formatting...
All matched files use Prettier code style!

[phase-19-check] Running test
npm warn Unknown env config "http-proxy". This will stop working in the next major version of npm.

> telegram-task-earning@0.19.1 test
> node --test

✔ Admin auth routes are composed behind validation, session, and CSRF gates (89.184371ms)
✔ configured Admin IP policy rejects disallowed networks before authentication (18.711859ms)
✔ Express foundation serves service, liveness, readiness, and safe 404 responses (99.051386ms)
✔ readiness returns 503 without disclosing database errors (34.904182ms)
✔ web bootstrap verifies MySQL, configures HTTP, becomes ready, and shuts down (29.326512ms)
✔ web bootstrap fails closed and releases resources for an unsupported database (2.344115ms)
✔ web bootstrap connects Redis for distributed protection and closes it on shutdown (4.92444ms)
✔ migration dry run validates all files without secrets or a live database (233.948051ms)
✔ seed and rollback dry runs are offline and deterministic (529.407103ms)
✔ unknown database command options fail closed (193.065421ms)
✔ example verification succeeds and redacts sensitive placeholders (231.672473ms)
✔ using the example as a runtime environment fails closed without leaking secrets (167.795394ms)
✔ runtime verification succeeds from deployment environment values (174.860659ms)
✔ wallet and history endpoints require a verified Telegram session (86.736992ms)
✔ wallet API returns string amounts and cursor pagination metadata (19.014793ms)
✔ wallet history rejects excessive limits and unknown query input (16.61217ms)
✔ task APIs require a server-verified Telegram user session (89.300623ms)
✔ task start requires CSRF, an empty body, and an Idempotency-Key (57.336861ms)
✔ claim validates ownership-shaped IDs and returns server reward data (17.77847ms)
✔ Admin task lifecycle routes enforce their exact permission (20.48312ms)
✔ public referral endpoints require a verified Telegram session (82.766715ms)
✔ Admin referral routes enforce distinct view, review, and settings permissions (58.631551ms)
✔ Admin review requires CSRF, review permission, reason, and resource version (25.782662ms)
✔ public Mystery Box endpoints require a verified Telegram session (74.634679ms)
✔ free claim requires CSRF, an empty body, and an Idempotency-Key (64.208144ms)
✔ Admin reads, claims, management, and lifecycle use distinct permissions (48.876267ms)
✔ public method, quote, and withdrawal history endpoints require verified Telegram identity (103.589348ms)
✔ quote and create use strict schemas, CSRF, and a required idempotency key (58.688516ms)
✔ Admin withdrawal reads and decrypted destination details use distinct permissions (18.14937ms)
✔ Admin review checks the submitted decision permission and payout confirmation is separate (22.173526ms)
✔ content endpoints require verified Telegram identity (115.365984ms)
✔ announcement read evidence requires CSRF and an empty strict body (50.275092ms)
✔ Admin banner reading, editing, and publishing use separate permissions (13.533425ms)
✔ Admin settings and feature flags enforce exact permissions and strict versions (19.636565ms)
✔ Notification inbox requires Telegram identity and read mutation requires CSRF (120.047184ms)
✔ Template reads and broadcast approval require their exact Admin permissions (27.863472ms)
✔ Reminder creation validates timezone-shaped schedule inputs before service execution (11.78265ms)
✔ earning history and leaderboard require a Telegram-authenticated user (60.697525ms)
✔ financial analytics require their exact high-sensitivity permission (18.99993ms)
✔ report range and leaderboard pagination are rejected before service execution (16.551751ms)
✔ Mini App shell renders EJS with a narrowly scoped official Telegram SDK CSP (69.955405ms)
✔ Mini App module assets revalidate and private paths remain inaccessible (34.8288ms)
✔ Maintenance allows only the public shell/assets while protected API stays closed (33.536638ms)
✔ Banned sessions can load the shell for an error screen but cannot access API data (19.558266ms)
✔ admin shell and assets are public but contain no account data and deny framing (119.807312ms)
✔ every operational route fails closed without its exact read permission (80.348494ms)
✔ authorized reads validate pagination, return string amounts, and record audit context (21.372232ms)
✔ catalog exposes only allowed screens and hides payment account details from reviewers (12.653723ms)
✔ maintenance preserves shell access and follows configured admin access policy (24.634559ms)
✔ upload size exception requires permission and CSRF and does not enlarge other routes (53.414816ms)
✔ all Phase 19 operations reject anonymous callers even with a valid anonymous CSRF token (175.530154ms)
✔ all Phase 19 operations enforce their exact permissions before invoking the service (79.514457ms)
✔ every authorized operation routes a strict validated body and trusted actor context (92.148702ms)
✔ CSRF, malformed money, stale-body fields and oversized input are rejected without a write (28.624165ms)
✔ public enrollment keeps CSRF protection and strict one-time-token validation (20.911965ms)
✔ Phase 9 user endpoints require a server-attached session (97.713584ms)
✔ profile mutation requires CSRF and rejects unapproved fields (72.009638ms)
✔ admin user inspection requires both admin authentication and users.view (21.651646ms)
✔ maintenance keeps bootstrap, authenticated admins, and configured webhook reachable (24.155469ms)
✔ Telegram auth and webhook routes are composed behind their security gates (165.932411ms)
✔ Admin authentication and RBAC trust only server-attached identity and permissions (1.268391ms)
✔ Admin IP allowlist supports exact addresses and bounded CIDR ranges (8.151076ms)
✔ database schema enforces the current security and money contract (68.283311ms)
✔ unexpected async errors disclose neither stack traces nor embedded Telegram tokens (80.121387ms)
✔ invalid incoming request IDs are replaced with server-generated identifiers (15.484922ms)
✔ security headers allow Telegram framing only through CSP (87.414937ms)
✔ production responses enable HSTS and HTTPS upgrade policy (18.972824ms)
✔ strict CORS rejects unknown origins and handles approved preflights (17.26431ms)
✔ signed double-submit CSRF flow protects unsafe JSON requests (31.481393ms)
✔ body parsing rejects unsupported, malformed, and oversized payloads safely (25.723844ms)
✔ rate limiting emits standard controls and fails closed when its store fails (18.279956ms)
✔ maintenance gates application traffic but preserve liveness (12.997333ms)
✔ readiness fails safely when the distributed security dependency is unavailable (9.739322ms)
✔ Phase 10 migration makes ledger entries append-only and excludes pending balances (7.781789ms)
✔ ledger repository locks account rows in deterministic database order (1.612911ms)
✔ wallet history keeps cursor values parameterized (0.490678ms)
✔ runtime ledger repository contains no entry update or delete operation (13.721616ms)
✔ Phase 11 migration snapshots attempts and blocks duplicate active attempts and claims (14.179666ms)
✔ public task mapping never exposes destination or internal database identifiers (0.653509ms)
✔ Admin task filters keep hostile input parameterized (0.487793ms)
✔ task completion uses the existing transaction for ledger settlement (18.579695ms)
✔ task routes declare separate permissions for viewing, editing, publishing, and review (0.953844ms)
✔ Phase 12 migration preserves referral evidence and optimistic state transitions (5.950775ms)
✔ Admin referral search keeps hostile input in query parameters (0.57323ms)
✔ Referral reward settings require string minor units and matching versions (3.2096ms)
✔ Task completion invokes referral activation inside its existing transaction (5.078811ms)
✔ Referral API exposes reads only while Admin mutations require exact permissions (2.202436ms)
✔ Referral activation amount comes only from validated server settings (0.790462ms)
✔ Phase 13 migration enforces single-active, free-only, immutable claim evidence (5.850315ms)
✔ claim flow locks user and reward state before atomic ledger settlement (1.929501ms)
✔ client cannot select the box, reward, amount, ticket, or paid access fields (2.988942ms)
✔ Admin claim search keeps hostile values parameterized (0.473052ms)
✔ repository hardcodes zero cost and no purchase on every box insert (0.341847ms)
✔ route permissions separate claim evidence from lifecycle and configuration (2.774975ms)
✔ Phase 14 migration protects immutable quotes, requests, approvals, history, and payouts (11.267528ms)
✔ withdrawal creation locks user, quote, and method before holding funds and consuming the quote (9.222575ms)
✔ client payloads cannot choose fees, net totals, status, approvals, or payout evidence (4.838895ms)
✔ Admin search values remain parameterized and LIKE metacharacters are escaped (0.606559ms)
✔ destination details use authenticated encryption context and a separate hash (2.570071ms)
✔ manual provider is the only enabled payout implementation and rejects automatic mode (0.828348ms)
✔ route permissions separate reads, sensitive details, decisions, payout, methods, and settings (1.670867ms)
✔ Phase 15 migration versions content and protects lifecycle evidence (7.248308ms)
✔ public banner query requires active time window and verified public media (1.945595ms)
✔ public announcement query binds user reads and server-owned visibility windows (1.313638ms)
✔ public tutorial queries expose published rows only with safe cover media (1.832968ms)
✔ content routes separate management, viewing, and publishing permissions (9.162406ms)
✔ configuration routes enforce exact settings, flag, theme, currency, and maintenance permissions (0.755661ms)
✔ raw Admin text is converted to safe HTML and never passed through as body_html (2.864488ms)
✔ public media serving uses verified metadata, containment, size, and hash controls (3.364219ms)
✔ Phase 16 migration protects immutable template and delivery evidence (4.452513ms)
✔ Outbox claim query uses row locks, leases, bounded attempts, and SKIP LOCKED (1.503809ms)
✔ Message routes separate view, edit, approval, cancellation, and reminder permissions (3.361855ms)
✔ Telegram worker has one allowlisted method and never stores raw provider response (3.855597ms)
✔ Broadcast audience excludes deleted and non-writable Telegram accounts (0.941016ms)
✔ Phase 17 migration protects immutable leaderboard and rollup evidence (4.523688ms)
✔ leaderboard materialization snapshots privacy-safe display data (1.681683ms)
✔ earning history is sourced from posted ledger evidence and uses keyset pagination (1.961559ms)
✔ financial totals and operational reports use distinct permissions (0.935488ms)
✔ Telegram re-sync merges profile data instead of erasing privacy preferences (0.633529ms)
✔ Mini App modules use local resolvable imports and do not persist authentication material (58.919779ms)
✔ Mini App shell permits zoom, has safe-area viewport and loads no inline code (1.337454ms)
✔ Mini App CSS retains mobile clearance, keyboard focus and reduced effects (1.291375ms)
✔ media processor decodes pixels, removes appended data and strips metadata (17.672305ms)
✔ media processor rejects disguised SVG, mismatched MIME, truncated data and excess pixels (19.862273ms)
✔ upload accepts only strict filenames, bounded base64 and explicit supported media types (7.53923ms)
✔ upload writes only generated paths and stores a digest matching the served pixels (15.039471ms)
✔ operational searches bind escaped wildcards and reject unknown query models (0.857171ms)
✔ console projections exclude password, session, payload and raw security evidence columns (0.428556ms)
✔ admin user filters keep hostile search and status values out of SQL text (1.183025ms)
✔ admin user repository parameterizes pagination and search values (1.392054ms)
✔ profile writes update only allowlisted preference columns (0.363048ms)
✔ Telegram webhook requires the exact secret header without reflecting it (1.655645ms)
✔ approved project directories exist (7.340455ms)
✔ package metadata is private, ESM, exact-pinned, and script-complete (8.3891ms)
✔ runtime policy accepts supported LTS lines and rejects unsupported lines (0.402146ms)
✔ web entry point fails closed when deployment configuration is missing (589.406501ms)
✔ repository does not contain a real environment file (2.01655ms)
✔ password success creates only a staged two-factor challenge (2.336965ms)
✔ unknown and incorrect Admin credentials return the same public failure (1.131317ms)
✔ valid TOTP atomically advances replay state and promotes the challenge (0.938712ms)
✔ invalid TOTP revokes its challenge and commits lockout evidence (1.177426ms)
✔ one-time bootstrap creates an active 2FA Super Admin under a database lock (1.959906ms)
✔ bootstrap command refuses missing one-time inputs before opening MySQL (0.516426ms)
✔ native Argon2id hashes verify correctly and reject malformed resource parameters (157.650115ms)
✔ AES-256-GCM encrypts TOTP secrets with admin-bound authenticated context (1.763766ms)
✔ TOTP matches RFC 6238 vectors and blocks accepted-step replay (1.831205ms)
✔ recovery codes are one-time-hashable, bounded, and never store plaintext (2.809686ms)
✔ admin challenge is opaque, hashed at rest, short-lived, and cookie-separated (3.069261ms)
✔ authenticated admin session loads server-side permissions and rolls idle expiry (1.422239ms)
✔ operational error classes expose stable codes and HTTP statuses (1.206349ms)
✔ AppError rejects invalid status codes and unstable error codes (0.430178ms)
✔ unknown errors normalize to a non-exposed internal failure (0.233416ms)
✔ malformed JSON normalizes to a safe client error (0.131225ms)
✔ configuration modules map validated values and preserve bigint-safe database options (11.789002ms)
✔ complete configuration is deeply frozen (1.652731ms)
✔ diagnostic projection does not expose configuration secrets (2.475191ms)
✔ MySQL version policy accepts supported Oracle MySQL and rejects alternatives (1.533954ms)
✔ acquired MySQL connections are initialized with UTC and strict SQL mode (0.268819ms)
✔ query helpers keep values parameterized and identifiers allowlisted (0.705796ms)
✔ pagination helpers clamp limits and calculate stable metadata (0.227908ms)
✔ transaction helper commits success and rolls back failure (0.502866ms)
✔ transaction helper retries only deadlock-class errors (0.212806ms)
✔ example template contains every declared key and validates in template mode (27.321258ms)
✔ valid production values are parsed into typed and frozen environment data (6.646796ms)
✔ runtime parsing rejects placeholders without exposing their values (2.046365ms)
✔ production validation rejects insecure transport, proxy, cache, logging, and cookie choices (0.924982ms)
✔ cross-field validation rejects unsafe TTL and upload directory relationships (0.734529ms)
✔ cross-field validation keeps route limits within the global request budget (3.192404ms)
✔ database configuration requires UTC and TLS for remote production servers (0.727058ms)
✔ path traversal and unknown template keys are rejected (2.821604ms)
✔ duplicate environment keys fail before parsing (0.70133ms)
✔ file loading rejects file typos while ignoring unrelated process variables (14.076864ms)
✔ unrelated process variables are ignored when strict file mode is not requested (0.817292ms)
✔ environment and nested diagnostic redaction hide all sensitive values (0.715281ms)
✔ health-check CLI parses bounded options and rejects unknown input (1.485182ms)
✔ health-check URL defaults locally and rejects embedded credentials (0.22933ms)
✔ health-check client validates the response contract (2.391998ms)
✔ application lifecycle moves through starting, ready, draining, and stopped (1.11242ms)
✔ application lifecycle rejects impossible transitions (0.338562ms)
✔ graceful shutdown stops HTTP before closing the database and is idempotent (19.298636ms)
✔ shutdown deadline force-closes connections and still closes the pool (21.024215ms)
✔ secret redaction handles nested keys, tokens, URL credentials, bigint, and cycles (1.344383ms)
✔ JSON logger applies thresholds, child bindings, and stderr separation (0.928998ms)
✔ ledger validation rejects unbalanced, duplicate-account, and unsafe amount inputs (1.960407ms)
✔ balanced reward posts atomically and rebuilds the user projection (16.083079ms)
✔ a repeated ledger idempotency key returns the committed result without new entries (1.823364ms)
✔ reusing a ledger idempotency key for different data is rejected (1.197646ms)
✔ a debit cannot make a user available account negative (0.665557ms)
✔ reversal appends opposite entries and restores reward and lifetime projections (3.984538ms)
✔ wallet cursor is signed, round-trips, and rejects tampering (3.085906ms)
✔ wallet history validation bounds limit and rejects unknown query fields (1.999725ms)
✔ wallet returns authoritative integer strings and projection health (0.636454ms)
✔ history preserves available and held deltas and emits a signed next cursor (0.689963ms)
✔ projection comparison identifies exact mismatched fields (0.209842ms)
✔ reconciliation repair locks user accounts before replacing the snapshot (0.584837ms)
✔ Admin-created task always uses the server settlement currency and starts as draft (4.954557ms)
✔ publishing a future timer task uses optimistic versioning and scheduled state (1.184927ms)
✔ unsupported verification integrations and stale Admin versions fail closed (1.087773ms)
✔ an early task claim rolls back without creating a ledger reward (20.846633ms)
✔ verified task claim posts ledger and completion in one transaction (2.56254ms)
✔ manual verification claim becomes pending without issuing a reward (0.980433ms)
✔ claim idempotency replay returns the committed completion before task mutation (0.928597ms)
✔ task validation accepts only server-governed task fields and integer minor units (6.521951ms)
✔ eligibility rules fail closed when stored configuration is malformed (1.144327ms)
✔ eligibility evaluates username, geography, progress, and account age server-side (1.614184ms)
✔ completion policy enforces active, global, one-time, daily, and cooldown limits (0.36415ms)
✔ task configuration uses deployment URL policy and rejects unavailable callbacks (0.848378ms)
✔ start and claim idempotency hashes are scoped and compared safely (1.033011ms)
✔ completion period keys make one-time, daily, and repeatable awards deterministic (0.354626ms)
✔ scheduled task activates safely and snapshots all reward-critical fields on start (16.497273ms)
✔ an existing active attempt blocks a second start before any insert (1.436741ms)
✔ start idempotency replay returns the immutable destination snapshot (1.144707ms)
✔ referral policy uses safe defaults for invalid database settings (1.250134ms)
✔ referral activation waits for the server-counted task threshold (1.765638ms)
✔ eligible referral activation posts both server-controlled rewards atomically (2.020606ms)
✔ shared-device risk holds a referral and never posts a reward (0.492971ms)
✔ account restriction is evaluated before age and task progress (0.218985ms)
✔ Admin referral setting update versions history and commits optimistic write (2.338468ms)
✔ stale Admin referral setting version rolls back without writing (0.794257ms)
✔ Admin approval records review then re-runs activation in the same transaction (1.360257ms)
✔ Admin-created boxes persist only server-enforced free access fields (1.801301ms)
✔ stale Admin box updates roll back before a database mutation (1.086562ms)
✔ publish validates the reward pool and performs one optimistic transition (1.206049ms)
✔ reward inventory cannot be reduced below its immutable awarded count (0.596114ms)
✔ daily eligibility uses server task count and timezone period boundaries (15.199618ms)
✔ task requirements are evaluated from authoritative integer counts (0.18209ms)
✔ cooldown eligibility is anchored to the last committed claim (0.358041ms)
✔ weighted selection uses an injected cryptographic ticket boundary (0.346985ms)
✔ exhausted rewards are excluded and fixed mode requires exactly one reward (0.713718ms)
✔ publishing enforces free-only configuration and a valid reward pool (1.00472ms)
✔ Admin payloads cannot introduce payment fields or unsafe money numbers (4.227659ms)
✔ eligible free claim reserves inventory, posts ledger, and stores evidence atomically (17.397497ms)
✔ insufficient verified task progress rolls back before reward or ledger mutation (1.340988ms)
✔ a committed idempotency key returns the original claim without a new transaction (0.58661ms)
✔ earning-restricted users cannot reserve inventory or receive a reward (1.802263ms)
✔ reject atomically refunds the full held gross amount, never only the net amount (3.41878ms)
✔ the first high-value approval remains under review and does not move money (0.335548ms)
✔ the required final approval transitions to approved with immutable approval evidence (0.469316ms)
✔ manual paid confirmation settles held gross into exact net payout and fee credits (0.831743ms)
✔ decrypted destination details are released only after stored hash verification (2.629119ms)
✔ payout confirmation rejects stale versions and non-approved states before settlement (0.848267ms)
✔ global and method rules combine using the stricter financial limits (1.646592ms)
✔ percentage fees round upward and all amounts stay decimal strings (0.559469ms)
✔ eligibility is derived from server account, task, referral, wallet, day, and cooldown state (0.974515ms)
✔ restricted and too-new accounts fail closed (0.183091ms)
✔ dynamic destination fields reject unknown values and produce a safe display mask (0.970489ms)
✔ dual approval is required only at or above the configured high-value threshold (0.179707ms)
✔ withdrawal payload schemas reject client-controlled totals and unsafe numeric amounts (3.769099ms)
✔ Admin method and setting schemas enforce consistent fees and optimistic versions (7.347796ms)
✔ invalid stored setting values fall back to conservative defaults (1.390822ms)
✔ quote derives fee and expiry on the server without posting ledger entries (19.949372ms)
✔ request atomically encrypts details, holds the gross amount, consumes quote, and records history (3.847966ms)
✔ a concurrent quote-consumption conflict rolls back the complete request transaction (1.566493ms)
✔ idempotent request replays must match the original canonical input fingerprint (0.68808ms)
✔ managed setting policy preserves the free-only Mystery Box boundary (1.580764ms)
✔ managed setting policy bounds pagination and normalizes allowlisted URLs (0.33704ms)
✔ theme payload accepts the closed token contract and rejects CSS injection (4.072889ms)
✔ feature flag mutation permits rollout only and rejects targeting objects (1.419685ms)
✔ currency input canonicalizes ISO-style codes and caps decimal precision (1.706341ms)
✔ maintenance windows require strictly ordered timestamps (1.514957ms)
✔ setting updates write an immutable next-version record in one transaction (2.293892ms)
✔ setting updates reject null when it violates the stored value type (0.91076ms)
✔ settlement currency precision cannot change after ledger setup (0.689332ms)
✔ publishing a theme retires the former active theme inside the transaction (0.925903ms)
✔ plain content is encoded into inert server-generated HTML (0.999572ms)
✔ banner validation requires verified-media identity and paired actions (2.328182ms)
✔ announcement targeting schema is strict and date ordered (1.71299ms)
✔ tutorial validation rejects client lifecycle and malformed slugs (0.845975ms)
✔ announcement targeting fails closed for missing or mismatched user attributes (0.16853ms)
✔ disabled banner feature avoids every content database read (0.717664ms)
✔ banner creation rejects media that is not verified and public (0.860186ms)
✔ future announcement publishing selects scheduled state on the server clock (0.919884ms)
✔ tutorial creation rejects a URL outside the deployment allowlist (0.779206ms)
✔ media resolution blocks storage paths that escape the public root (0.432692ms)
✔ Telegram templates preserve allowlisted markup and escape every variable (1.617238ms)
✔ Template buttons are HTTPS-only and expose one closed Telegram keyboard shape (0.731755ms)
✔ Internal Telegram payload contract rejects arbitrary methods, chats, and oversized text (3.06808ms)
✔ Outbox claims use leases and exponential retry is bounded and honors Telegram retry-after (0.695882ms)
✔ Outbox worker completes successes and records failures without logging payloads (0.457338ms)
✔ Telegram job rejects malformed success responses instead of recording a false delivery (0.392552ms)
✔ Reminder next-run calculation follows IANA local time and ISO weekdays (39.86254ms)
✔ Broadcast creator cannot approve their own draft (0.645137ms)
✔ Transactional amount placeholders format integer minor units without floating point (0.233426ms)
✔ analytics periods use closed UTC dates and ISO calendar boundaries (2.154264ms)
✔ earning-history cursors are scoped, signed, and reject tampering (1.26126ms)
✔ earning history emits only signed server ledger deltas and an opaque next cursor (0.599369ms)
✔ earning summary keeps integer minor units and reports reversals separately (0.445861ms)
✔ public leaderboard uses snapshots and never requests Telegram identifiers (0.651847ms)
✔ rollup is idempotent per closed date and builds every allowlisted snapshot (1.329832ms)
✔ Admin financial reports keep monetary values behind a separate service method (0.518148ms)
✔ profile contract accepts explicit leaderboard privacy without accepting identity fields (2.091571ms)
✔ miniapp money formatting preserves every BIGINT minor unit including negative fractions (17.664373ms)
✔ miniapp amount entry never uses floating point or accepts exponent notation (0.266395ms)
✔ miniapp navigation normalizes hashes and rejects malformed or traversal routes (1.046392ms)
✔ miniapp rejects credential-bearing and executable URLs (0.171044ms)
✔ withdrawal field validation mirrors allowed format and option contracts (0.772906ms)
✔ miniapp API rejects non-local paths before sending credentials (0.664656ms)
✔ miniapp shares CSRF retrieval and coalesces concurrent identical mutations (4.001594ms)
✔ failed CSRF requests can be retried and do not send a mutation (4.567543ms)
✔ uncertain financial mutations reuse the same key on deliberate retry (1.1465ms)
✔ API failures retain safe request references and distinguish timeout (0.689122ms)
✔ authentication never invents a development identity outside Telegram (0.314677ms)
✔ theme tokens reject CSS injection and reset stale per-theme overrides (0.800627ms)
✔ admin client rejects external and traversal destinations before sending credentials (2.358738ms)
✔ admin mutations coalesce and use the admin CSRF token without persisting credentials (4.523778ms)
✔ failed mutations are never automatically retried and preserve error context (0.77608ms)
✔ session invalidation discards late responses and does not send an awaiting mutation (0.713558ms)
✔ 401 invalidates authentication while 403 keeps an actionable permission error (1.039431ms)
✔ catalog hides ungranted resources and exact withdrawal decision controls (0.372302ms)
✔ minor units remain decimal strings and numeric configuration rejects unsafe integers (0.399863ms)
✔ forms preserve optional omission, explicit null, booleans and nested reward values (136.843127ms)
✔ create task form submits only supported server fields and keeps rewards precise (26.741873ms)
✔ editing plain content round-trips server HTML without double encoding (11.79609ms)
✔ reminder form reconstructs template keys and keeps nested audience rules (12.332825ms)
✔ template editor sends all strict fields and represents nullable button config (14.150631ms)
✔ settings editor fixes free-only protection and preserves server versions (15.868898ms)
✔ resource query only includes route-supported fields and identities are encoded (0.369678ms)
✔ login completes password challenge and TOTP without persisting a password (27.819531ms)
✔ withdrawal confirmation requires review and duplicate clicks share one request (19.510518ms)
✔ conflict keeps the draft visible and prevents immediate resubmission (25.014017ms)
✔ resource UI renders hostile text inert and ignores a disposed response (14.782998ms)
✔ dashboard renders daily chart and table from real response values and isolates financial reports (13.6509ms)
✔ search phrases with spaces and encoded URL punctuation stay on the local admin endpoint (0.674249ms)
✔ admin entry restores an authenticated shell and logout clears its private data (17.495911ms)
✔ administrator form loads named roles, reviews the request and displays a one-time invitation safely (158.059677ms)
✔ wallet correction editor creates a stable hidden idempotency key per draft (17.130161ms)
✔ resolved fraud records offer no further review action (37.888091ms)
✔ enrollment accepts own password then verifies TOTP without retaining invitation or password fields (29.132393ms)
✔ closing enrollment while a response is pending cannot restore its secret (12.675734ms)
✔ enrollment API obtains anonymous admin CSRF and never exempts its mutations (1.293067ms)
✔ mobile authenticator app switching hides the setup key but permits returning with a code (15.306444ms)
✔ retry risk acknowledgement requires a deliberate checked choice (12.340126ms)
✔ administrative changes recheck active session and fresh permission before writing (6.227445ms)
✔ identity management cannot be delegated by assigning only a manage permission (1.182143ms)
✔ invitation stores only a token digest and does not provision active credentials (5.661866ms)
✔ self access changes and stale administrator versions cannot revoke the last operator (4.74772ms)
✔ administrator role/status change and session revocation commit together (2.537873ms)
✔ a cancelled, unenrolled administrator cannot be enabled through access editing (0.759326ms)
✔ built-in roles cannot be edited, while custom grants revoke assigned sessions (1.266759ms)
✔ account ban revokes sessions without leaving a permanent banned status after expiry (1.559322ms)
✔ unban removes only the selected scope and requires its separate permission (0.892884ms)
✔ competing fraud decisions have one winner and persist the review reason (1.785037ms)
✔ wallet correction preparation is idempotent and cannot change money (1.743516ms)
✔ wallet adjustment rejects self approval and posts exactly once under competing reviews (8.140631ms)
✔ insufficient debit rolls back review and ledger; rejection never changes money (0.852754ms)
✔ money and control inputs reject floats, forged actor fields and missing risk acknowledgement (1.607594ms)
✔ manual retry refuses sent, cancelled, unlinked, stale and permanent recipient failures (0.397289ms)
✔ manual retry retains attempt number/payload and only schedules one additional attempt (3.231722ms)
✔ retry rechecks delivery consent and cannot revive an ineligible campaign (0.312934ms)
✔ invitation enrollment consumes both tokens, encrypts TOTP, and returns recovery codes only once (4.045679ms)
✔ failed enrollment attempts commit their counter and stop verification after five codes (5.882122ms)
✔ outbox terminal failure records its linked job in the same executor and never writes for a lost lease (0.56627ms)
✔ administrative repositories bind arbitrary text and refuse arbitrary table names (0.62725ms)
✔ fraud evidence reveal redacts nested credentials and sensitive identity evidence (0.769901ms)
✔ admin user list schema caps page sizes and rejects deleted pseudo-filter (3.859363ms)
✔ admin user mappings preserve large numeric values as strings (1.039552ms)
✔ admin user list uses normalized pagination and parallel repository reads (0.501865ms)
✔ admin user detail combines profile, restrictions, wallets, and metrics (0.550506ms)
✔ cache returns a valid hit without invoking the loader (1.343462ms)
✔ cache fails open on malformed reads and write failures (0.373464ms)
✔ cache does not persist oversized responses (0.561303ms)
✔ local day and week boundaries are converted to UTC for Dhaka (13.690421ms)
✔ day boundaries respect daylight-saving transitions (0.596174ms)
✔ database and offset datetimes normalize to the same UTC representation (0.385982ms)
✔ theme tokens accept a closed safe schema and reject CSS injection (1.098639ms)
✔ setting guards accept only usable locale lists and IANA timezones (18.436939ms)
✔ bootstrap combines safe public configuration with user-scoped state (1.500525ms)
✔ dashboard returns decimal-safe strings and never exposes task destination URLs (6.360692ms)
✔ feature gates prevent disabled task and free-reward database reads (2.057191ms)
✔ database numeric guards reject unsafe representations (0.420994ms)
✔ free reward eligibility is display-only and honors frequency boundaries (0.225264ms)
✔ profile schema rejects Telegram-owned and financial fields (2.544564ms)
✔ profile reads expose Telegram IDs as strings and only public fields (1.191307ms)
✔ profile update validates flags/settings before opening a transaction (13.447971ms)
✔ disabled profile editing fails before a database transaction begins (0.720398ms)
✔ unsupported language and invalid timezone are rejected server-side (0.481684ms)
✔ memory rate-limit store increments and resets fixed windows (1.609877ms)
✔ Redis rate-limit store uses one atomic script and namespaced keys (0.539961ms)
✔ Redis client factory applies TLS verification and bounded reconnects (0.260507ms)
✔ Redis connection, readiness cache, and close lifecycle are bounded (0.460472ms)
✔ database readiness is cached and concurrent checks share one query (0.875388ms)
✔ database readiness fails closed without throwing dependency details (0.70092ms)
✔ migration runner applies each immutable migration once under a schema lock (6.661879ms)
✔ migration runner resumes after a partial DDL failure without replaying recorded statements (1.00482ms)
✔ migration runner rejects a changed file after it has been applied (5.783126ms)
✔ seeds require all migrations, run once, and rollback invalidates seed history (1.377793ms)
✔ validation middleware stores only schema-approved data and returns safe issues (9.320621ms)
✔ maintenance and ban gates use trusted server-side providers (0.619148ms)
✔ idempotency middleware hashes accepted keys and rejects duplicates (0.979072ms)
✔ audit middleware records completed mutations without delaying responses (4.68649ms)
✔ HMAC signatures are deterministic and reject modified input (1.322882ms)
✔ CSRF tokens are signed, session-bound, and time-limited (0.503156ms)
✔ secure random and idempotency helpers enforce bounded keys (0.379693ms)
✔ managed URL allowlist requires approved schemes, domains, and credential-free URLs (0.428766ms)
✔ HTML and plain-text helpers encode markup and remove unsafe controls (0.271222ms)
✔ SQL splitter preserves quoted semicolons and removes comments (1.151768ms)
✔ migration parser requires both sections and rejects session control (0.837852ms)
✔ seed parser accepts one section and checksum is deterministic (0.534122ms)
✔ all migration and seed files load in contiguous order (54.558632ms)
✔ Telegram exchange creates one user, first-touch referral, and opaque session atomically (2.763318ms)
✔ existing Telegram users retain their internal database ID during profile sync (0.483437ms)
✔ simultaneous first login recovers from a unique-user insert race (0.903169ms)
✔ Telegram API client sends JSON webhook settings and exposes no token on failure (2.214413ms)
✔ bot command routing is private-chat only and preserves a bounded referral payload (0.455365ms)
✔ Mini App keyboards require HTTPS and Telegram HTML is escaped (0.255889ms)
✔ webhook service acknowledges duplicates and retries failed processing safely (0.298913ms)
✔ failed webhook retries cannot replace the payload for an existing update ID (0.703593ms)
✔ Telegram initData validates HMAC, freshness, and bigint-safe identity strings (3.852633ms)
✔ Telegram initData rejects tampering, expiry, future dates, and duplicate protected fields (2.550312ms)
✔ Telegram initData rejects bot users and unsafe numeric identities (1.061875ms)
✔ user sessions store only a hash and emit an HttpOnly secure cookie (2.622098ms)
✔ cookie and IP parsing fail safely on malformed values (5.054084ms)
✔ session authentication maps public identity and rolls idle expiry server-side (0.860105ms)
✔ public IDs are 26-character sortable Crockford identifiers (0.544347ms)
ℹ tests 414
ℹ suites 0
ℹ pass 414
ℹ fail 0
ℹ cancelled 0
ℹ skipped 0
ℹ todo 0
ℹ duration_ms 3797.660077

[phase-19-check] Running verify:environment:example
npm warn Unknown env config "http-proxy". This will stop working in the next major version of npm.

> telegram-task-earning@0.19.1 verify:environment:example
> node bin/verify-environment.js --example

Telegram Task Earning — Phase 19 environment verification
Mode: example-template
Source: .env.example (found)
Node.js: v24.19.0 (supported)
Keys: 87/87 recognized
Placeholders: 13
Environment verification passed.

[phase-19-check] Running verify:database-schema
npm warn Unknown env config "http-proxy". This will stop working in the next major version of npm.

> telegram-task-earning@0.19.1 verify:database-schema
> node scripts/verify-database-schema.js

Database schema verified: 23 migrations, 6 seeds, 77 tables, 259 named constraints, 202 up statements, 178 down statements, 19 seed statements.

[phase-19-check] Running build:css
npm warn Unknown env config "http-proxy". This will stop working in the next major version of npm.

> telegram-task-earning@0.19.1 build:css
> node scripts/build-css.js

npm warn Unknown env config "http-proxy". This will stop working in the next major version of npm.

> telegram-task-earning@0.19.1 build:css:miniapp
> postcss resources/css/miniapp.css --output public/miniapp/css/app.min.css --env production

npm warn Unknown env config "http-proxy". This will stop working in the next major version of npm.

> telegram-task-earning@0.19.1 build:css:admin
> postcss resources/css/admin.css --output public/admin/css/admin.min.css --env production

CSS bundles built successfully.

[phase-19-check] Running verify:project
npm warn Unknown env config "http-proxy". This will stop working in the next major version of npm.

> telegram-task-earning@0.19.1 verify:project
> node scripts/verify-project.js

Phase 19 project verification passed: 79 directories, 481 required files, and 34 npm scripts.

Phase 19 quality gate passed.